ABSTRACT Before the establishment of the spot electricity market in China, an energy imbalance settlement (EIS) mechanism has been proposed as a transitional solution to address the imbalances between actual consumption and contracted energy in the forward electricity market. It plays a crucial role in cultivating electricity retailers, maintaining the stability of the balancing account, and promoting a smooth transition to market-oriented reforms. Given this background, a novel EIS mechanism with a piecewise linear penalty pricing scheme is proposed, learning from the performance-based regulation (PBR) in distribution systems. For optimizing the parameters in the proposed EIS mechanism, a stochastic bilevel model is presented considering two kinds of stakeholders involved, namely the power exchange (PX) and retailers. In the upper-level model, an optimal parameter setting model for policymakers to minimize the variance of deposit in the balancing account of PX is presented. In the lower-level model, a decision-making tool for retailers under the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) is developed. As a self-balance measure of retailers, flexible demands are incorporated into the lower-level problem. Consumer psychology is applied to quantify customer consumption adjustments in response to the financial incentives given by retailers. The risk faced by the retailers is modeled using conditional value-at-risk (CVaR), taking into account the uncertainties associated with renewable energy production and customer demand. Simulation results of a provincial electricity market in China show that the proposed method can effectively motivate retailers to improve their imbalance management capability and assist policymakers in determining the parameters of the EIS mechanism. Besides, the proposed method provides insights into the impacts of parameter setting of the EIS mechanism on the behavior and performance of retailers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Forward contract transaction is one of the essential trading forms in the wholesale electricity market. Playing the role of active intermediaries between the wholesale market and customers, electricity retailers fulfill large shares of their electrical energy procurements through forward contracting [1] The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Fatih Emre Boran.
(e.g., bilateral contracts account for about twice the volume traded in the spot market in PJM and the proportion in NETA exceeds 90% [2] ). The imbalances between the contracted volume and the actual extracted energy are inevitable due to the inaccuracy of load forecasting. Therefore, it is among top priorities to tackle the energy imbalances through a marketoriented way [3] . Balancing markets are usually designed to provide a mechanism for settling the imbalances and allow system operators (SOs) to maintain secure operation of the power system [4] . It can be categorized into two classes: day-ahead balancing markets and real-time balancing markets [5] . For example, PJM and Midwest ISO introduce realtime balancing markets to adjust imbalances with day-ahead schedules [6] , [7] , whereas the National Electricity Market of Australia introduces a combination of real-time market clearing and post-settlement mechanism [8] . On the other hand, the Balancing Mechanism in the UK [9] , the Energy Imbalance Service Market in the Southwest Power Pool [10] , and the Regulating Market in the Nordic system specifically are balancing markets that are already established. However, the balancing market has not yet been implemented in China, nor the day-ahead market. Electricity transactions are mainly conducted in forms of forward contracts on time scales from months to years, and ''month'' refers to the shortest trading and settlement period. In order to provide a procedure for settling the inevitable discrepancies between the contracted energy and actual consumption of retailers, energy imbalance settlement (EIS) mechanisms have been introduced to Chinese forward electricity markets, which are managed by the power exchanges (PXs).
The main design problems involved in the EIS mechanisms consist of imbalance settlement pricing and parameter setting. A framework designed for policymakers that identifies the critical balance settlement design variables and performance criteria is proposed in [12] . After comparing two different settlement rules (i.e., pay as bid and uniform pricing), reference [13] suggests that a settlement rule based on uniform pricing should be adopted in German balancing power market to ensure efficiency. An agent-based model is established in [14] to analyze the impact of six alternative imbalance pricing mechanisms (i.e., single pricing, dual pricing, two-price settlement, additive component, imbalance pricing based on total costs, and alternative payment direction). Simulation results illustrate that single pricing results in the lowest imbalance costs. Using the principles of mechanism design and public good theory, an incentive compatible imbalance settlement procedure is developed in [1] , which guarantees revenue sufficiency for SOs and provides financial incentives for balance responsible parties. In summary, the current literature mainly explores the impacts of different EIS mechanisms, and few studies have been conducted on the quantitative design of EIS mechanisms. In this paper, a mathematical model for optimally setting the parameters of the EIS mechanisms is presented.
In the process of determining the parameters of the EIS mechanism, strategic behavior of retailers is one of the important areas within the policy development. Retailers are considered to assume the balance responsibilities of enduse customers [15] . Considering the uncertainty of customer loads and spot market prices, the performance of several retailer strategies for determining forward loads to manage the settlement risk is explored in [16] . Thus, the EIS mechanism determines the way retailers act in the forward electricity markets [17] . Measures may be taken by retailers to reduce the penalty costs incurred by EIS mechanism, such as direct load control [18] , integrating distributed energy resources (DER) with virtual power plant (VPP) [19] , regulating customer's load profile [20] . Among those measures, the method utilizing the flexibility of customer consumption, namely the decreasable load (DEC) and increasable load (INC) [21] , is most commonly used in China. In order to qualify the available DEC/INC volume that customers are willing to provide given a financial incentive, consumer psychology is applied in this paper. On this basis, the DEC/INC deployment strategy of a retailer is formulated to offset part of the energy imbalances instead of being fully penalized in the EIS mechanism.
Furthermore, retailers are required to meet a minimum level for the consumption of renewable energy according to the final policy paper of renewable portfolio standard (RPS) issued by China's National Energy Administration on May 15, 2019 [22] . The implementation of RPS significantly influences the market structure, market behavior, and economic performance of China's electricity market [23] . Besides, the impacts of renewable power producers on the EIS mechanism cannot be neglected with high penetration of the intermittent renewable energy source (RES) [24] . Interaction between the production uncertainty of wind power producers and the market settlement requirements is explored in [25] , [26] . Based on a comprehensive review of the balancing market, policy recommendations for the adaptation of balancing arrangements to the participation of renewable producers in electricity balancing markets are provided in [27] . However, to the best of our knowledge, the existing publications contain very few studies that analyze a scenario in which retailers are required to fulfill quota obligations [28] , [29] , which is consistent with future Chinese RPS design and has considerable impacts on the design of EIS mechanism. In order to explore the impacts of RPS on the parameter setting of EIS mechanism, the energy procurement plans of retailers under RPS is studied in this paper with the renewable energy power producers (RPPs) integrated into conventional power producers (CPPs).
During the implementation of EIS mechanism, Power Exchanges (PXs) spend money to procure balancing services and receive money from penalizing poorly performed retailers. The imbalances between the balancing service procurement costs and penalty income are put into the balancing account. As mentioned above, the purchase and selling strategies of retailers have direct impacts on the balancing account of PX. On the basis of this interaction, a bilevel model is proposed in this paper to determine the parameters of the EIS mechanism in China. The upper level develops a longterm planning framework for a policymaker to determine the parameters of EIS mechanism in the forward electricity market of China. With the objective of minimizing the variance of deposit in the balancing account, this approach not only reduces the volatility of balancing account but also removes any doubt from market participants that PXs apply EIS mechanisms for money making. The lower level develops a decision-making tool for retailers, which is composed of three parts: i) to determine the energy procurement plans in the forward electricity market, ii) to set compensation prices for DEC/INC at the end of the previous month, iii) to establish the DEC/INC deployment strategy at the end of the current month. Consumer psychology is applied to quantify customer's willingness to increase or decrease their consumption in response to the financial incentives given by retailers. In addition, renewable energy procurement is incorporated into the model for retailers to meet quota obligations. Considering the uncertainties and volatilities of renewable energy production and customer energy consumption, the stochastic programming approach is used to model the decision-making problem. The conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) [30] is applied to measure the risk of profit variability. The management strategies for both risk-neutral and risk-averse retailers are investigated.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) A novel EIS mechanism with a piecewise linear penalty pricing scheme is introduced to Chinese forward electricity, which overcomes the defects of the widely used single pricing EIS mechanism that provides little incentives for retailers to control their deviation rates at a low level.
2) The stochastic bilevel programming for optimizing the parameters in the proposed EIS mechanism is presented, taking into account the interaction between retailers and PX, which is the first time to perform the optimal parameter setting of EIS mechanism in a quantitative way. 3) A decision-making model for retailers is developed, through which the retailers can better manage their financial risks by deploying DEC/INC to offset part of their energy imbalances rather than fully committing to the EIS penalties. 4) The impacts of the implementation of RPS on retailer behavior and parameter setting of EIS mechanism is explored, which provides a reference for PXs in the design of EIS mechanism within the RPS development. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the current electricity market structure in China and the proposed PBR-based EIS mechanism. Section III develops a stochastic bilevel optimization to determine the parameters of EIS mechanism, and the optimal decision-making model of retailers under the EIS mechanism is formulated. Case studies and result analyses are presented in Section IV. Finally, a brief conclusion and discussion of future works are given in Section V.
II. A NOVEL EIS MECHANISM BASED ON PBR A. THE CURRENT ELECTRICITY MARKET STRUCTURE IN CHINA
For a Chinese retailer, there are two important markets for physical exchange of electricity, i.e., the year-ahead/ month-ahead bilateral contract market for long-term trading and the month-ahead centralized bidding market for medium-term trading [31] . In the bilateral market, participants are permitted to sign contracts in advance from months to multi-year before the current month M . The transaction quantity and price are determined by bilateral negotiation, which can reflect the relationship between supply and demand [32] . In addition, the long-term bilateral contract can prevent the electricity prices from fluctuating violently as it stabilizes the market risks for both sides. The centralized bidding market, organized by the PX, is a typical type of double-sided auction mechanism. It is worth to mention that the double-sided auction is usually regarded as a kind of spot exchanges, which refers to a future of a day or less, down to hours or minutes before the physical delivery [33] , [34] . However, the centralized bidding market is implemented merely for the monthly power exchange in China, where the uniform-pricing is applied. The electrical energy purchased through the above two transactions is collectively referred to as the contracted energy. For each retailer, the deviations between the contracted volume and the actual consumption are unavoidable due to the inaccuracy of load forecasting. FIGURE 1 shows the contracted and actual volume of the monthly electrical energy consumption in Guangdong Province, China, in 2018. As can be seen, the load forecast errors showed considerable uncertainty throughout the year, with the purchased volume either below or above the actual extracted energy. Hence, the deviations lead to potential imbalance costs for all balance responsible parties, who are responsible for financially achieving a balance between their own supply and demand [15] . The EIS mechanism tackles the imbalances of the retailers after a trading period ends, and its parameters affect the way retailers behave. For PXs, to apply a lenient penalty leaves little motivation for retailers to improve their load prediction accuracy and makes EIS mechanism inefficient. On the other hand, the deregulation of the retail electricity market is still at an exploration stage, with the aim of cultivating electricity retailers and introducing competition among retailers. Hence, adopting a severe penalty is supposed to cause financial losses to retailers and depress them to participate in the market. For these reasons, an appropriate EIS mechanism in the forward electricity market is highly demanded for maintaining the stability of market operation. 
B. A NOVEL EIS MECHANISM WITH A PIECEWISE LINEAR PENALTY PRICING SCHEME
Existing researches about EIS mechanism mainly focus on three aspects, e.g., the impacts of different EIS mechanisms on market participants in [14] and [35] , imbalance pricing mechanism in [12] and [14] , and imbalance settlement rule in [1] , [13] and [26] . Few studies have been conducted on the quantitative design of EIS mechanisms. Nowadays, single pricing EIS (SP-EIS) mechanism is widely used to penalize the energy imbalances in most provinces of China. As shown in FIGURE 2, the exemption thresholds are set for electricity retailer's monthly contracted energy in the forward electricity market. If the energy consumption is within the exemption thresholds, the positive and negative imbalances are settled by a market-oriented price and no penalty is charged to the retailers (in Scenario-1 and Scenario-2, respectively). The imbalances beyond the thresholds are given an additional penalty (in Scenario-3 and Scenario-4), which is defined as the EIS penalties. Settlement thresholds and imbalance penalty price vary among different provinces in China and directly affects the profit of retailers. For example, the exemption thresholds in the Guangdong provincial electricity market were ±2% in 2018. The total imbalance penalties of electricity retailers reached 170 million CNY, accounting for 22.1% of the contract income, and 20.3% of retailers incurred losses in monthly transactions [36] . The exemption thresholds in Chongqing provincial electricity market were ±5%, which were more lenient than that of Guangdong. However, because the market participants were unfamiliar with the new trading rules and the implementation of EIS mechanism was complicated, retailers were exempted from the imbalance penalty in 2017. Thus, the design and parameter setting of the EIS mechanism should be adapted to different regions, according to the discrepancy between electricity markets in the operation conditions, deviation control levels and market participation.
Similar circumstances are faced by quality regulation in the distribution system. In order to improve operational efficiency and reduce electricity prices, performance-based regulations (PBR) have been implemented in distribution systems in many countries, such as the United Kingdom, Norway, and the United States. However, distribution system operators (DSOs) often take cost-cutting measures (e.g., reducing the investment in equipment and prolonging the maintenance interval of equipment) to make sufficient profit, which may lead to deterioration of service quality and reliability [37] , [38] . In order to stem such a development, many PBR regimes have been accompanied by a penaltyreward mechanism (PRM), under which distribution companies are given a certain amount of reward or penalty according to the level of service reliability [39] . In addition, PBR is defined and applied separately for each distribution area in a particular area type (rural or urban). The EIS mechanism in forward electricity markets has certain similarities with the penalty-reward mechanism in distribution system reliability regulation. Utilities are penalized according to their performance deviation from the target level to give incentives for achieving a socioeconomically optimal level under the two mechanisms. Additionally, both two mechanisms are applied separately for each area with different characteristics, such as economic development level, energy structure, and geography condition. Four different forms of PRM are shown in FIGURE 3, i.e., minimum standards, continuous, capped, and dead band [40] . Minimum standards (Type-1) have a discrete relationship between quality and price. Despite how much a DSO under-performs to meet the target level, minimum standards always give a fixed penalty. Thus, this form is not conducive to encourage DSOs to perform better than the target, and the resulting system reliability is thereby determined by the target level. Obviously, the widely used SP-EIS mechanism resembles the minimum standards PRM, for the fact that the energy imbalances outside the exemption thresholds are settled by a fixed price. The influence of the energy deviations on the overall balancing of the power system has not been adequately considered, which leaves the retailers with no incentives to control their deviation rates at a lower level.
The latter three forms have a continuous relationship between quality and price, which have better prerequisites to give incentives for achieving an optimal socioeconomically reliability level than minimum standards. Under the VOLUME 7, 2019 continuous form (Type-2), the rewards/penalties increase in line with the deviation from the target level. The capped form (Type-3) is similar to the continuous one, with the difference that the maximum reward/penalty is set for the DSOs to limit the financial risk. The dead band scheme (Type-4) has a dead zone without any penalty or reward around the target to reduce the DSO profit volatility caused by stochastic factors. Outside the dead band, rewards and penalties vary with the reliability level, which are similar to the continuous scheme.
For overcoming the defects of single pricing, a piecewise constant pricing EIS mechanism has been established in Jiangsu Province, China, with the penalty price increasing by multistep. The negative energy imbalances beyond −3% are settled by 10% of the coal-fired benchmark on-grid price. The positive energy imbalances between 3% and 10% are settled by 10% of the retail catalog price, and retailers need to pay 2 times the price for the positive imbalances beyond 10%. Different penalty prices are tended to be applied to penalize the energy imbalances distributed in various deviation rate range. In fact, a piecewise linear penalty function has been implemented to settle the deviation between the dispatched volume in the day-ahead market and the actual load in the Norwegian electricity market [31] , [33] . Accordingly, incorporating the capped scheme with the dead band one, a novel EIS mechanism with a piecewise linear penalty pricing scheme (PLP-EIS) is introduced to the forward electricity market of China. The relationship between the penalty price and the contracted energy deviation rate of retailers under the PLP-EIS mechanism is illustrated in FIGURE 4. Contracted energy deviation rate is defined as the ratio of monthly energy imbalances to the contracted volume. The planning horizon consists of T trading periods indexed by t.
denotes the scene set of all scenarios. Let E B k (ω, t) denote total contracted energy of retailer k in month t under scenario ω, and E S k (ω, t) represents the total energy consumption of the concerned customers of retailer k in month t under scenario ω. Then, the deviation rate of retailer k is defined as:
According to the deviation rate, the penalty pricing curve can be divided into three parts, i.e., penalty-free region, negative deviation region, and positive deviation region. The penalty-free region is established to reduce the financial risk of retailers, within which the penalty is zero. Deviations between the actual consumption and the contracted energy volume are inevitable due to stochastic variations, such as weather and policies, around the reference of a certain class. Therefore, a certain amount of energy imbalances is considered to be acceptable, and no penalties are applied. In fact, dead bands are widely used in the power industry. In addition to the individual threshold value for each DSO calculated on an annual basis, Estonia, Romania and UK also specify a minimum financial threshold value for planned compensation claims to be processed [41] , [42] . When the deviation rate is higher than the positive threshold, the energy imbalances are settled by a positive imbalance penalty price, which increases linearly from zero as the deviation rate rises and reaches the capped value at the inflection point Z, as shown in FIGURE 4. The negative deviation region is similar to the positive one. Price caps are set to reduce the financial risk of retailers and avoid the possibility of bankruptcy due to the inferior imbalance control in a certain month.
Let θ 1 and θ 2 denote the negative and positive imbalance penalty threshold of the penalty-free area respectively. τ 1 and τ 2 represent the deviation rate that reaches the negative imbalance penalty price cap ρ P −,max and positive imbalance penalty price cap ρ P +,max , respectively. Hence, the penalty price for retailer k is mathematically presented as:
where ρ P (α k ) represents the imbalance penalty price for retailer k when its contracted energy deviation rate is α k .
III. A STOCHASTIC BILEVEL OPTIMIZATION FOR THE DESIGN OF EIS MECHANISM A. FRAMEWORK OF THE BILEVEL OPTIMIZATION
The two stakeholders involved in the design of the EIS mechanism are PX and retailers. As a non-profit organization, PX is responsible for establishing the transaction implementation rules, and strives for keeping the balancing account close to zero in order to dispel the doubt from market participants that PX implements the EIS mechanism for making profit. The retailers need to adjust their management strategies according to the specific provisions of the EIS mechanism for maximizing the profit. Meanwhile, retailers' behaviors will also affect the balancing account, and then have impacts on the decision-making of PX. Therefore, a bilevel programming model for the design of EIS mechanism is proposed in this section.
In the upper level, PX focuses on optimizing the parameters of the EIS mechanism, with the purpose of minimizing the variance of deposit in the balancing account during a planning horizon T . Two main cash flows of the balancing account are the total EIS penalties received from retailers and the balancing service costs paid for power producers.
In the lower level, each retailer seeks for maximizing its profit considering risk management. One of their major decision problems is to develop the optimal electricity procurement plans [15] . As shown in FIGURE 5, retailers adopt two approaches to address the problem of meeting instantaneous and variable loads: i) purchasing electricity from CPPs through participating bilateral market and monthly centralized bidding market, and ii) signing bilateral contracts with RPPs [43] (e.g., wind power, solar power, hydropower, distributed generation). Commonly, retailers assume the EIS responsibilities of end-use customers. In order to reduce the penalty costs, DEC/INC is needed to utilize the flexibility of customers' electricity consumption, either in the positive or negative direction. It provides an extra economic benefit for end-use customers and reduces the risks of retailers associated with the EIS mechanism. To sum up, the decisionmaking of a retailer in this paper consists of three stages: i) to make the energy procurement plans in the forward electricity market, ii) to set the compensation prices for DEC/INC at the end of month M − 1, iii) to determine the DEC/INC deployment strategy by the end of month M .
On the basis of the interaction between PX and retailers, FIGURE 6 depicts the framework of the proposed bilevel optimization model. The decision problems are related to the uncertainties of renewable energy production and actual power demand. To describe the stochastic characteristics of the above two sources of uncertainties, an efficacious heuristic procedure for scenario generation in [44] is applied to generate scenarios. The backward reduction technique in [45] has been adopted to reduce the computational burden of solving the problem.
B. UPPER LEVEL OPTIMIZATION FOR DETERMINING THE PARAMETERS OF EIS MECHANISM
The income of the balancing account mainly comes from the EIS penalties paid by retailers. It is presented as (3) and (4), shown at the bottom of this page, where C P k (ω, t) and C P (t) denote the EIS penalties of retailer k in month t under scenario ω and the total EIS penalties of all retailers in month t, respectively. K is the number of retailers. π(ω) represents the probability of the occurrence of scenario ω.
The main expenditure of the balancing account consists of the payments for the upward and downward balancing services. Since the balancing markets have not been established in China, monthly pre-listing balancing mechanism (MPBM) has been carried out to deal with the electrical energy imbalances from the power generation side in the forward electricity market [46] . Under MPBM, SO adjusts producers' outputs upward/downward according to supply and demand situation, with the objective to minimize the costs to handle the monthly energy imbalances of the power system. When the actual energy consumption is expected to be higher than the contract volume, there is a need for upward production and vice versa. Let E B (ω, t) denote the monthly total contracted energy in the forward electricity market in month t under scenario ω, and the monthly total energy consumption is represented by E S (ω, t). Then, the monthly contract imbalances of the power system can be calculated by E D (ω, t) = E S (ω, t) − E B (ω, t), where the positive value means that the actual demand exceeds the contracted energy, and the negative value indicates a surplus of contracted energy. Let ρ U (t) and ρ D (t) represent the up-regulation service compensatory price for the up-regulated power generation and down-regulation service compensatory price for the down-regulated power generation of MPBM in month t, respectively. Therefore, the balancing service costs C A (t) in month t is presented as:
where C A (ω, t) represents the total costs for purchasing up-regulation and down-regulation services in month t under scenario ω. Given the proposed EIS mechanism with a piecewise linear penalty pricing scheme, there are six parameters to be determined, i.e., θ 1 , θ 2 , τ 1 , τ 2 , ρ P −,max , and ρ P +,max . Since the penalty price is capped to avoid unreasonable amounts of penalty for retailers, the cap imbalance thresholds τ 1 and τ 2 should be related to the historical deviation rates of retailers. The absolute value of τ 1 and τ 2 is usually assumed to be equal to the standard deviation of historical deviation rates. In order to simplify the settlement and mitigate retailer's strategic behavior, the positive imbalance penalty price cap is usually set to be the same as the negative one. In the following, the positive and negative imbalance penalty prices (i.e., ρ P −,max and ρ P +,max ) are collectively referred to as the imbalance penalty price cap ρ P max . Then, the design problem involves three parameters to be optimized, i.e., the negative imbalance penalty threshold θ 1 , the positive imbalance penalty threshold θ 2 , and the imbalance penalty price cap ρ P max . The optimization of the upper level is formulated as:
where ρ AVPD denotes the absolute value of price differences (AVPD) between the clearing price of the centralized bidding market and the retail catalog price. δ, σ 1 and σ 2 are three auxiliary positive integer variables. represents a minimum perceived gap for retailers. Constraint (10) describes the relationship between the penalty price cap and the AVPD, in which the penalty price cap is required to be associated with the market price, so as to reflects the demand-supply situation. It is practically set as an integer multiple of the AVPD. For example, the penalty price is 2 times the AVPD in Guangdong's EIS mechanism. Constraints (11)- (12) state that the penalty thresholds should be an integer multiple of the minimum gap. Considering the perceived gap of thresholds for retailers, it makes no sense for the thresholds being too precise. 
C. LOWER LEVEL OPTIMIZATION FOR DETERMINING THE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR A RETAILER 1) DEC/INC RESPONSE MODEL BASED ON CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY
Customer loads are usually divided into the flexible part and the inelastic part. The flexible part refers to the potential consumption increment and decrement on the baseline energy consumption of customers. The baseline is usually regarded as the original energy consumption of customers in the most comfortable way, which is equal to the sales volume without employing DEC or INC. In this paper, it is assumed that all customers can interact with retailers to receive and send information and adjust their flexible loads to a lower or higher consumption level. As shown in FIGURE 7, when there is a large amount of contracted energy surplus at the end of month M , energy consumption is stimulated by retailers through economic incentives to reduce negative penalty costs (Scenario-1). Contrarily, when the original consumption is forecasted to be higher than the contract volume, customers are induced to decrease their consumption by retailers to diminish positive penalties (Scenario-2). According to consumer psychology, customer response is related to the compensation per unit consumption [16] . Intuitively, the curve of customer response can be partitioned into the dead zone, linear zone, and saturation zone, as shown in FIGURE 8. The dead zone means that a customer will hardly respond unless the compensation exceeds the perceived threshold ρ C k,min . Within the linear zone, customer response rate rises linearly with the increase of the compensation price. However, the response rate cannot increase indefinitely. When the compensation exceeds the turning point ρ C k,max , the response ability of customers tends to be saturated, and no more consumption can be adjusted.
Energy consumption reduction ratio is used to describe customer's willingness to adjust their consumption to a lower level, which is equal to the proportion of the total available DEC volume to the flexible energy consumption at a given economic incentive. Let ρ k,max represent the compensation threshold in the dead zone and saturation zone of the DEC response curve, respectively. Then, the consumption reduction ratio λ IL k (t) is expressed as:
where µ IL k represents the slope of the linear zone of the DEC response curve and λ IL k max is the saturation value of the energy consumption reduction ratio.
Similarly, energy consumption increase ratio is used to describe the INC response behavior and is defined as the ratio of the consumption increment that customer is willing to provide to the flexible energy consumption volume. Let λ UL k (t) denote the consumption increase ratio of retailer k in month t, and be expressed as:
where ρ C,UL k (t) denotes the compensation per MWh consumption increment to customers given by retailer k in month t. ρ C,UL k,min and ρ C,UL k,max represent the compensation threshold in the dead zone and saturation zone of the INC response curve, respectively. µ UL k is the slope of the linear zone of the INC response curve and λ UL k max is the saturation value of the energy consumption increase ratio.
Therefore, the available DEC and INC volume that can be deployed by a retailer are respectively presented as:
where E IL k (ω, t) and E UL k (ω, t) represent the available DEC and INC volume of retailer k in month t under scenario ω, respectively. E 
2) DEC/INC DEPLOYMENT STRATEGY FOR RETAILERS UNDER PLP-EIS MECHANISM
Due to the fact that DEC and INC deployment strategies are completely in the same way, this section takes DEC deployment strategy in a positive imbalance scenario as an example to describe the determination process of a retailer in details. In fact, the contracted energy volume and compensation price of the retailers are usually determined in month M − 1 in the forward electricity market of China. Consequently, the energy consumption reduction ratio of DEC is fixed so that retailers can estimate the amount of energy consumption that customers are willing to decrease. At the end of each month, retailers should determine the amount of consumption reduction to deploy after comparing the losses reduced with the compensation paid. The loss function of retailer k in cases of positive imbalance is illustrated in FIGURE 9 , which means the losses per MWh electrical energy sold. Obviously, the energy sold by retailers is profitable when the deviation rate is low, that is, the losses is negative. As the deviation rate gets higher, the payment for the imbalance settlement costs and the EIS penalties may exceed the sales income so that retailers may incur losses. Let ρ S k (t) represent the weighted average price of all electricity retail contracts signed by retailer k and its customers in month t. ρ Q (t) denotes the energy settlement price for the imbalances in month t, which is usually set equal to the clearing price of the monthly centralized bidding market. Therefore, the loss function is defined as:
where ρ L k (α k , t) represents the losses per MWh electrical energy sold by retailer k in month t when the deviation rate is α k .
Note that A and B are two critical points in FIGURE 9. Let E F k (ω, t) denote the original energy consumption of retailer k in month t. Then, the original deviation rate of retailer k in month t under scenario ω is expressed as α 0
] is the penalty price at α 0 k (t), namely the biggest penalty that retailer k may be imposed in month t. α IL k (t) is the deviation rate of retailer k in month t exactly when the losses are equal to the compensation for DEC, which reflects the willingness of a retailer to employ DEC. The smaller the α IL k (t), the more willing retailer k is to employ DEC for reducing the positive energy imbalances, and vice versa. Accordingly, α IL k (t) is represented as:
where ρ
represents the inverse function of the loss function ρ L k [ * ]. As shown in FIGURE 9, the losses per MWh energy consumption of a retailer vary with the deviation rate, whereas the compensation price is a fixed value. As a result, the actual consumption reduction deployed by a retailer has a close relationship with the original deviation rate α 0 k (ω, t) and the compensation price ρ 
(t). The economical consumption reduction E
IL,e k (ω, t) of retailer k is defined as the actual consumption reduction such that the deviation rate of the retailer k is precisely equal to α IL k (t) after decreasing E IL,e k (ω, t) amount of consumption, and it is expressed as:
The economical consumption reduction is the optimal DEC volume to deploy for a profit-seeking retailer to diminish the EIS costs and achieve the maximized profit, regardless of the available DEC volume limit. On the one hand, if the actual consumption reduction is greater than E IL,e k (ω, t), the compensation for DEC will be higher than the losses corresponding to the reduction part that exceeds E IL,e k (ω, t). Thus, it is more economical to accept the EIS penalties rather than deploying DEC. For another, if the actual consumption reduction is less than E IL,e k (ω, t), the losses incurred by a unit of excessive consumption are greater than the compensation for DEC. Therefore, there still remain opportunities for a retailer to reduce the EIS penalties through deploying DEC. In addition, a retailer will not employ DEC to reduce the positive imbalances unless the reduced losses per MWh consumption reduction are higher than the compensation paid for it. Then, taking the available DEC volume limit into account, the actual consumption reduction is expressed as:
where E IL,a k (ω, t) represents actual consumption reduction deployed by retailer k in month t under scenario ω.
Similarly, incorporating the available INC volume limit with the INC deployment strategy for a retailer, the actual consumption increment E UL,a k (ω, t) is expressed as:
where α UL k (t) represents the deviation rate of retailer k in month t when the losses are precisely equal to the INC compensation.
Taking account of the deployed DEC/INC energy, the actual consumption of retailer k or, in other words, the actual sales volume is represented as:
3) RENEWABLE ENERGY PROCUREMENT OF RETAILERS UNDER RPS
Since RPS combined with the tradable green certificate (TGC) has been instituted in China, non-hydro RPPs become increasingly involved in market competition, and retailers are required to comply with quota obligations by purchasing green certificates or non-hydropower renewable energy [28] . RPPs face greater risks in contract performance compared to CPPs due to their randomness and volatility. RPPs are considered to be able to sign bilateral contracts with retailers in the form of power purchase agreement (PPA) [47] , through which retailers make purchases of the full power quantities generated by RPPs during some specific future periods at a relatively lower fixed price. For RPPs, the balancing responsibility risk caused by the uncertainty of production can be transferred to the retailer by PPA. On the other hand, as the retailer purchases the overall power generation of RPPs and bears the risk of balancing responsibility, the electricity purchase price agreed in PPA is usually lower than the average price in the wholesale market. Hence, retailers and RPPs achieve a reasonable redistribution of profits and risks. For simplicity, it is assumed that retailers complete the quota obligation by purchasing wind and solar energy, and the specifications of the wind turbines and solar photovoltaic panels acquired by a retailer are the same, as well as the real-time outputs. Let ν W k and ν PV k be the number of wind turbines and photovoltaic panels, respectively. The monthly power generation of a wind turbine and a photovoltaic panel acquired by retailer k in month t under scenario ω are denoted by E W k (ω, t) and E PV k (ω, t), with the purchase prices ρ W k (t) and ρ PV k (t), respectively. Then, the costs for procuring energy from RPPs are expressed as:
where C B,W k (ω, t) and C B,PV k (ω, t) denote the costs for purchasing wind and solar energy of retailer k in month t under scenario ω, respectively. Inequation (26) represents the quota obligation constraint, where γ is the quota to be met by retailers in planning horizon T .
4) DECISION-MAKING STRATEGY FOR ELECTRICITY RETAILERS UNDER EIS MECHANISM
In the lower level, each retailer seeks for maximizing its profit (difference between income and cost) considering risks. Retailer's income is mainly made by procuring power from electricity wholesale markets and reselling the procured power to the end-use customers [48] . The costs of retailers are composed of four parts: the energy purchase costs, the deviation settlement costs, EIS penalties, and the compensation for DEC/INC. Let E k (t). Then, the total monthly contracted energy of retailer k can be calculated as: (27) The income and expenditure of retailer k are respectively represented as:
where
, and C comp k (ω, t) represent the income, the costs for purchasing energy from CPPs, the deviation settlement costs, and the compensation for DEC/INC of retailer k in month t under scenario ω, respectively.
Then, taking account of the renewable energy procurement, the profit H E k (ω, t) of retailer k in month t under scenario ω is expressed as:
The risk measurement of profit variability used in this paper is the CVaR because it has good mathematical properties and can be easily handled using scenarios [30] . For a given confidence level β k , CVaR is defined as the expected profit of the (1 − β k )×100 scenarios with the lowest profits. Since probability distribution functions of random parameters are approximated through scenarios, CVaR can be computed by solving the following optimization problem [15] :
where F CVaR k,β (t) denotes the CVaR of retailer k in month t when the confidence level is β k . The optimal solution ξ * k (t) of ξ k (t) is a risk measure known as Value-at-Risk (VaR), which represents the highest profit such that the probability of experiencing a profit not higher than ξ * k (t) is less than or equal to 1 − β k . η k (ω, t) is a positive auxiliary variable which is equal to the difference of VaR and the profit of scenario ω in month t, if this difference is positive, and zero if the scenario has a profit greater than VaR.
Note that the decision-making in each month is independent. Then the optimization problem of retailer k in month t is formulated as (36) . The overall objective function combines the profit function (32) with the CVaR risk measurement (33) . The latter is weighted using a risk factor ψ k ∈ [0, +∞), indicating a trade-off between profit and risk. The larger the value of ψ k is, the more risk-averse retailer k appears to be. The contract energy E B k (ω, t), the DEC compensation price ρ C,IL k (t), the INC compensation price ρ C,UL k (t), the VaR ξ k (t), and the auxiliary variable η k (ω, t) in each month VOLUME 7, 2019 are decision variables of the lower level programming. 
IV. CASE STUDIES A. DATA PREPARATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
The actual data of a provincial electricity market in China are served for demonstrating the feasibility of the proposed method. A decision horizon of one year is considered, and the monthly centralized bidding market clearing prices of the whole year are shown in FIGURE 10 with an average price of 727.78 CNY/MWh. The characteristics of electricity retailers are provided in TABLE 1. The electricity retailers with a larger market share and a lower deviation rate are classified as the large-scale electricity retailer (LRT).
Medium-scale electricity retailer (MRT) refers to the electricity retailers with a medium-scale market share and a higher deviation rate, and small-scale electricity retailer (SRT) refers to the electricity retailers with the smallest market share and the highest deviation rate. In order to simplify and clarify the simulation, the same risk weighting factor ψ k for each retailer is considered, and the confidence level of CVaR is set as 95%. As a means to hedge the risk of price volatility in the monthly centralized bidding market, retailers sign contracts with RPPs and CPPs in the bilateral contract market, which is considered to account for about 70% of the total electrical energy sold to customers based on the market data. Assume that all retailers fulfill their quota obligations by signing bilateral contracts with wind power producers with the same negotiated price 683 CNY/MWh. The standard deviation of the overall deviation rate in the demand side is 7% according to the historical data. The up-regulation and down-regulation service compensatory prices are 90 CNY/MWh and 200 CNY/MWh, respectively. The dead zone and saturation zone thresholds of DEC response curve are 50 CNY/MWh and 250 CNY/MWh, respectively. The slope of the linear zone of the DEC response curve µ IL k is 4, and the saturation value of the consumption reduction rate is considered to be equal to 100%. For ease of analysis, the corresponding coefficients of INC are considered to be the same as DEC's. The monthly consumption benchmarks of the end-use customers and deviation rates of the three types of retailers are demonstrated in FIGURE 11, in which the stacked histogram depicts the deviation rate, and the curve graphs illustrate the monthly consumption benchmarks. Using the heuristic procedure for scenario generation described in [44] , 50 original energy consumption scenarios are generated for 12 months. Additionally, 20 wind power generation scenarios are considered in the model which are generated randomly using a normal distribution based on historical data. Considering that the power demand and wind power production scenarios are uncorrelated, the scenario tree generated includes 1000 scenarios. Then, the backward reduction algorithm in [45] is applied to reduce the number of scenarios to 50.
B. STOCHASTIC BILEVEL PROGRAMMING RESULTS FOR EIS MECHANISM
In order to analyze the impact of the optimal parameters setting on the decision-making problem of retailers, the risk weighting factor and the quota for RPS are considered to be 0 in the reference case. Solving the stochastic bilevel programming model, we obtain the optimal parameters of the EIS mechanism in the benchmark case, as shown in TABLE 2. The deposit in the balancing account experiences the smallest variance in the planning horizon, when θ 1 = −2.5%, θ 2 = 2.5%, and the imbalance penalty price cap is 5 times as much as the AVPD. Under the optimized parameters for EIS mechanism, the optimal purchasing strategy for the three types of retailers is to purchase a slightly less amount of electrical energy than the consumption benchmark, especially in months with large deviations. The average proportion is 0.21% for LRT, 0.45% for MRT, and 0.63% for SRT, indicating that the retailers with a larger deviation rate tend to purchase less electrical energy. FIGURE 12 depicts the optimal compensation prices for INC and DEC of three types of retailers under the optimal EIS mechanism. In terms of timescale, the compensation prices in February are the highest (e.g., SRT sets 103.38 CNY/MWh for DEC and 103.51 CNY/MWh for INC), whereas the compensation price in August is the lowest (e.g., LRT sets 57.02 CNY/MWh for DEC and 55.00 CNY/MWh for INC). In addition, SRT always provides the largest compensation for DEC/INC among the three types of retailers, while the compensation prices given by LRT keeps the smallest all the time. It demonstrates that with the increase of deviation rate, the compensation for DEC/INC should be raised to obtain more consumption flexibility for reducing the EIS penalties. Note that the compensation price for INC is slightly higher than that for DEC in each month, and the two prices tend to be consistent when the deviation volume is relatively large. This result is due to the fact that the centralized market clearing prices are much higher than the prices negotiated through bilateral contracts, so the positive imbalances lead to greater loss than negative imbalances. For demonstrating the advantages of the proposed EIS mechanism, the PLP-EIS mechanism is compared with the widely-used SP-EIS mechanism. Three retailers (i.e., LRT-A, LRT-B, and LRT-C) of type LRT are given, which have the same demand benchmarks and different deviation rates ranging from low to high. The expected profit and CVaR of the three retailers in June are calculated as shown in TABLE 3. The expected profit (i.e., 563 × 10 3 CNY) of LRT-A under the PLP-EIS mechanism is much higher than that under the SP-EIS mechanism (i.e., 497 × 10 3 CNY), so does the CVaR. Note that the risk index CVaR of LRT-A under the SP-EIS mechanism is −161 × 10 3 CNY, which indicates that the average loss of LRT-A is 161 × 10 3 CNY with a confidence level set as 90%. The CVaR of LRT-B under the PLP-EIS mechanism is −1768×10 3 CNY. It is 61.8% lower compared to the CVaR under the EIS mechanism (−1093 × 10 3 CNY), signifying that LRT-B is faced with a greater risk of losses under the PLP-EIS mechanism. Note that the expected profit of LRT-C under the PLP-EIS mechanism is a negative value (i.e., −48 × 10 3 CNY). It can be deducted that under the PLP-EIS mechanism, a retailer can obtain a significantly higher expected profit and keep the risk significantly lower than that under the SP-EIS mechanism if the deviation rate is controlled at a relatively low level. Therefore, the EIS mechanism proposed in this paper is of great practical significance for encouraging retailers to improve the accuracy of load forecasting and reduce the system deviation rate.
C. IMPACTS OF RISK FACTORS ON THE DECISION-MAKING OF RETAILERS AND THE PARAMETER SETTING OF THE EIS MECHANISM
The retailer problem in the lower level model has also been solved for different risk factors. The optimal decisions of energy procurement and compensation prices for DEC/INC of LRT in June are provided in TABLE 4. As can be seen from TABLE 4, the expected profit ranges from 545 × 10 3 CNY if the risk is ignored (ψ k = 0) to 526 × 10 3 CNY if the risk is accounted for (ψ k = 2). In other words, a 26% increase in CVaR from 275 × 10 3 CNY to 346 × 10 3 CNY leads to a 3% reduction in the expected profit. Considering that the losses caused by the positive imbalances are greater than that of the negative imbalances under the same conditions, scenarios with a large positive deviation may lead to huge losses. Consequently, as the risk factor grows larger, the retailer tends to purchase more electrical energy in the monthly centralized bidding market. Accordingly, LRT declines the compensation price for INC by 6%, while increases the compensation price for DEC by 15% to ensure the adequacy of flexible demands for offsetting the positive energy imbalances. This result is significant since it provides relevant and useful information for retailers in decision-making.
The expected profit versus the CVaR for different value of risk factors is shown in FIGURE 13. According to the retailer's risk preference, the decision-making strategy can be divided into four classes, namely the risk-neutral, relatively risk-neutral, risk-averse, and relatively risk-averse strategy, respectively. The risk factors of the four risk strategies (i.e., 0 for the risk-neutral case, 0.15 for the relatively risk-neutral case, 0.3 for the relatively risk-averse case, and 2.0 for risk-averse case) are selected to provide a quantitative basis for retailers with various risk preferences. Assuming that all retailers in the market have the same risk preference, the optimization results of the bilevel programming model for the design of the proposed EIS mechanism with different risk factors are shown in TABLE 5. It can be seen that when retailers adopt a risk-averse strategy, the optimal negative and positive imbalance penalty threshold of EIS mechanism are −4% and 3.5%, respectively. The penalty price cap is 5 times the AVPD, which is the lowest among the four types of strategies. If all retailers adopt a risk-neutral strategy, the severest penalty will be applied in the EIS mechanism. Accordingly, through pre-test, the EIS mechanism parameters can be set up on the basis of simulating and analyzing the behavior of the market participants, so as to be adapted to the market operation conditions in different regions.
D. IMPACTS OF QUOTA ON THE DECISION-MAKING OF RETAILERS AND THE DESIGN OF EIS MECHANISM
With the implementation of RPS in China, the proportion of renewable energy generation increases year by year. For exploring the influences of RPS on the parameter setting of EIS mechanism, the bilevel optimization problem is performed for different quotas, and the optimal decision-making results of LRT in June are shown in TABLE 6. As can be seen from TABLE 6, with the quota increases from 10% to 30%, the CVaR plunges by 219% from 394 × 10 3 CNY (when γ = 10%) to −470 × 10 3 CNY (when γ = 30%). The negative value of CVaR indicates that there are significant chances for retailers to incur losses, thus the risk management is essential. As for the energy procurement plans, all three types of retailers purchase a minimum level of wind power generation to comply with quota obligations. Although the wind power price negotiated in PPAs is lower than the market clearing price and the weighted average price of the bilateral contracts signed with CPPs, the production uncertainty poses great losses to retailers for being more involved in the EIS penalty. The resulting profit declines by 28.37% (i.e., from 577 × 10 3 CNY to 413 × 10 3 CNY) as the proportion of renewable energy procurement increases. In addition, a 3.33% growth of the energy procurement is adopted, and the compensation prices for DEC and INC increase gradually with the quota becoming larger. Note that when the quota is relatively small (e.g., 10% and 15%), the compensation price for INC is lower than that for DEC, whereas it gradually exceeds the compensation price for DEC. This is a result of the increasing energy procurement leading to greater negative imbalance penalties, then more available INC volume is demanded. TABLE 7 shows the optimal parameters of the EIS mechanism for different quotas. It can be seen from TABLE 7 that as the quotas increase, the penalty-free region of the EIS mechanism should be set narrower, whereas the penalty price cap should be reduced gradually.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel EIS mechanism with a piecewise linear penalty pricing scheme is proposed in the current forward electricity market in China. Considering the interaction between PX and retailers, a bilevel model for optimally setting the parameters in the proposed EIS mechanism under RPS is established. The upper level model represents the minimization for the variance of deposit in the balancing account while the lower level incorporates three decision-making processes of a retailer, i.e., the energy procurement plans, the compensation price setting and the DEC/INC deployment strategy. Stochastic programming is applied to handle the two sources of uncertainties faced with the retailers, namely the production of RPPs and the actual consumption of consumers. CVaR is considered as a risk measure to lessen the financial risks to which the retailer is exposed because of the uncertainties. The overall problem is simulated in the case of a provincial electricity market in China. The main findings are as follows.
1) The expected profit of a retailer under the proposed EIS mechanism with a piecewise linear penalty pricing scheme is significantly higher than that under the existing single pricing scheme, as long as the deviation rate is controlled at a low level. This indicates that the proposed EIS mechanism plays a vital role in encouraging retailers to improve load forecasting accuracy and reducing system imbalances.
2) The risk-aversion degree of a retailer directly affects its decision-making strategy, which in turn has impacts on the balancing account. Overall, PX applies the severest penalty in the optimal EIS mechanism when retailers adopt risk-neutral strategy, whereas the optimal EIS mechanism for the risk-averse strategy adopts the most lenient penalty. Therefore, on the basis of pre-testing and simulating the behavior of market participants, the optimal parameters of the EIS mechanism can be determined to adapt to the different development of each provincial electricity market in China. 3) With the continuous increase of the quota of RPS, the range of the penalty-free zone in the EIS mechanism gets narrower correspondingly, whereas the penalty price cap should be reduced gradually. This paper studies the design of EIS mechanism under RPS in the forward electricity market. The proposed work can be used to analyze and forecast how a retailer behaves faced with the EIS penalty and the quota obligation, which provides a reference for the market designers in setting market parameters. 
